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Threats / Edimax / CVE-2025-1316
CVE-2025-1316 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-08-04

Edimax IC-7100 IP Camera vulnerability

Edimax IC-7100 IP Camera contains an OS command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) allowing remote code execution through improper input sanitization. The product is reportedly end-of-life or end-of-service.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unauthenticated attacker can inject arbitrary OS commands via specially crafted requests to achieve remote code execution on affected Edimax IC-7100 cameras. Active exploitation in the wild has been observed. Discontinuation of product use is recommended.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-03-195EPSS 0.73036 (verify live)6CVSS 9.33CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: yes · Impact: total4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
11 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-03-19).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.73036 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 9.3 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) · Affected: Edimax, IC-7100 IP Camera. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CNA-assigned (CVE.org), version 4.0, set at disclosure.
CVE.org ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE — CNA-assigned (CVE.org); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
CVE.org ↗Reported
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: totalCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
CISA-ADP ↗Reported
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 15 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious request containing shell metacharacters to bypass input validation and execute arbitrary commands on the camera.
Business
Compromised cameras become entry points for network reconnaissance, lateral movement, or deployment of malware within enterprise or residential infrastructure.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I establish persistent access by installing backdoors or reverse shells on vulnerable cameras to maintain control.
Business
Attackers gain persistent footholds in networks, enabling long-term surveillance, data exfiltration, or use of cameras in botnet operations.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I pivot from compromised cameras to attack other network devices or systems using the camera as a trusted internal host.
Business
Network segmentation failures allow attackers to breach more critical assets, increasing exposure to data theft or operational disruption.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 11 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CVSS 9.3 — CNA-assigned (CVE.org)
  • CISA SSVC triage disposition (CVE.org ADP)
  • CWE weakness mapping — CNA-assigned (CVE.org)
  • Catalogued by icscert (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by icscertCNA
    Credited with finding itAkamai SIRT reported this vulnerability to CISA.finder