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Threats / SolarWinds / CVE-2024-28987
CVE-2024-28987 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-08-04

SolarWinds Web Help Desk vulnerability

SolarWinds Web Help Desk contains hardcoded credentials allowing unauthenticated remote access to internal functionality and data modification.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A hardcoded credential vulnerability in Web Help Desk enables remote attackers to bypass authentication, access sensitive internal systems, and modify data without authorization. Active exploitation in the wild elevates risk.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-10-155EPSS 0.93299 (verify live)6Exploit Weaponized · public PoC7CVSS 9.13CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: yes · Impact: total4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-10-15).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.93299 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 9.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) · Affected: SolarWinds, Web Help Desk. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CNA-assigned (CVE.org), version 3.1, set at disclosure.
CVE.org ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-798 Hard-coded Credentials — weakness family: Authentication.CWE — CNA-assigned (CVE.org); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
CVE.org ↗Reported
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: yes · Technical Impact: totalCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
CISA-ADP ↗Reported
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 55 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
Public exploit available
Public exploit tooling is catalogued for this CVE (a public proof-of-concept / detection template). Catalog entries: Metasploit module, nuclei template. We link the catalog page(s) only — no payload or code is hosted or restated here.Link, never host — the catalog page is the source; basicsecurity.net does not redistribute payloads.
WeaknessCWE-798 · Hard-coded CredentialsAuthentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I discover the hardcoded credential embedded in the application or its documentation.
Business
Attackers gain unauthorized access to help desk systems containing sensitive customer and employee information.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I authenticate to Web Help Desk using the hardcoded credential without any user interaction or detection.
Business
Internal access controls fail to prevent unauthorized system entry, creating an undetected foothold.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I modify tickets, user records, or configuration data within the help desk system.
Business
Data integrity is compromised; support operations are disrupted and audit trails become unreliable.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I pivot to connected systems or extract credentials stored within the help desk database.
Business
The compromised help desk becomes a staging point for lateral movement across the organization's infrastructure.
5

Lights out — disruption & extortion narrative 5

Attacker
I maintain persistent access by creating additional accounts or backdoors within the application.
Business
Long-term compromise enables ongoing data theft, system manipulation, and potential regulatory violations.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 3 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CVSS 9.1 — CNA-assigned (CVE.org)
  • CISA SSVC triage disposition (CVE.org ADP)
  • CWE weakness mapping — CNA-assigned (CVE.org)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by SolarWinds (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by SolarWindsCNA
    Credited with finding itZach Hanleyfinder