Threats / SaltStack / CVE-2020-11652
CVE-2020-11652
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-08-04
SaltStack Salt vulnerability
SaltStack Salt contains a path traversal vulnerability in the salt-master ClearFuncs process that allows authenticated users to access arbitrary directories on the system.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
An authenticated attacker can exploit path traversal in Salt's master process to read or manipulate files outside intended directories, potentially exposing sensitive configuration data or enabling lateral movement within the infrastructure.
CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-034EPSS 0.86063 (verify live)5Exploit Weaponized · public PoC6CVSS 6.5 (CISA)3CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Impact: partial3
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreExploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
4 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.86063 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) · Affected: SaltStack, Salt. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CISA-assigned via the ADP container (CVE.org), version 3.1; the CNA left no metrics, so CISA's own score is used ahead of NVD.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-22 Path Traversal — weakness family: Path traversal / file.CWE assignment from the public NVD record (may be stale); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: partialCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 552 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
Public exploit available
Public exploit tooling is catalogued for this CVE (a functional/weaponized public exploit). Catalog entries: Metasploit module. We link the catalog page(s) only — no payload or code is hosted or restated here.Link, never host — the catalog page is the source; basicsecurity.net does not redistribute payloads.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I authenticate to the Salt master as a legitimate user or compromised account.
Business
Attacker gains initial access through valid credentials or credential compromise.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I craft malicious requests to ClearFuncs that use path traversal sequences to access directories outside the intended scope.
Business
Attacker bypasses directory restrictions through improper input validation.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I read sensitive files such as configuration data, private keys, or other system files accessible to the salt-master process.
Business
Confidential data exposure including credentials, keys, and system configuration.
4
Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4
Attacker
I use extracted credentials or configuration details to escalate privileges or move laterally across the managed infrastructure.
Business
Compromise spreads from the Salt master to managed systems and broader network.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05