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Threats / Oracle / CVE-2019-2725
CVE-2019-2725 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-06

Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability

Injection vulnerability in Oracle WebLogic Server Web Services component allows remote code execution. Actively exploited in ransomware campaigns.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

Critical remote code execution via unsafe deserialization in WebLogic Server Web Services. High exploitation prevalence with confirmed ransomware deployment. Immediate patching required.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-01-103Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.94468 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-01-10), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.94468 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
FIRST EPSS ↗High
Severity / affected
Affected: Oracle, WebLogic Server. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-74 CWE-74 — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-74 · CWE-74Injection
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No threat-actor attribution is established from the public feed for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious serialized Java object and send it to an exposed WebLogic Web Services endpoint.
Business
Attacker gains unauthenticated remote code execution on the application server.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the WebLogic process to establish persistence.
Business
Attacker achieves persistent access to critical infrastructure hosting business applications.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I deploy ransomware payloads across the compromised server and connected systems.
Business
Operations halt as data is encrypted; ransom demands disrupt business continuity and damage reputation.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by oracle (CNA)

    • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
    • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by oracleCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.