Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2014-6324
CVE-2014-6324
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-08-04
Microsoft Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) vulnerability
The Kerberos KDC in Microsoft allows authenticated domain users to escalate privileges to domain administrator level through a flaw in the authentication mechanism.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
Authenticated domain users can exploit a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Kerberos Key Distribution Center to gain domain administrator access, enabling complete compromise of Active Directory infrastructure and all connected systems.
CISA KEV Yes · 2022-03-254EPSS 0.87448 (verify live)5CVSS 8.8 (CISA)3CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Impact: total3Exploit Public PoC / detection · Metasploit module11
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreReported exploitation
9 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-03-25).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.87448 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) · Affected: Microsoft, Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC). Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CISA-assigned via the ADP container (CVE.org), version 3.1; the CNA left no metrics, so CISA's own score is used ahead of NVD.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-264 Permissions/Privileges/Access Control — weakness family: Authorization / access control.CWE assignment from the public NVD record (may be stale); the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: no · Technical Impact: totalCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 2684 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
Public exploit available
Public exploit tooling is catalogued for this CVE (a public proof-of-concept / detection template). Catalog entries: Metasploit module. We link the catalog page(s) only — no payload or code is hosted or restated here.Link, never host — the catalog page is the source; basicsecurity.net does not redistribute payloads.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I authenticate to the domain as a standard user with valid credentials.
Business
An insider or compromised standard user account becomes a pivot point for lateral movement.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I exploit the KDC vulnerability to escalate my privileges to domain administrator level.
Business
Administrative access is obtained without detection of privilege grant through normal channels.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I gain full control over the Active Directory infrastructure and all domain-joined systems.
Business
Complete compromise of the organization's identity and access management system, enabling data theft, system manipulation, and persistent backdoor installation.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05