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Threats / Adobe / CVE-2009-3960
CVE-2009-3960 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-08-04

Adobe BlazeDS vulnerability

Adobe BlazeDS contains an information disclosure vulnerability affecting LifeCycle and ColdFusion deployments. The flaw has been exploited in the wild and associated with ransomware campaigns.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

Active exploitation and ransomware association indicate this vulnerability poses significant risk to affected Adobe product users. High EPSS score reflects widespread attack potential despite unavailable CVSS metrics.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-03-074Ransomware use Flagged4EPSS 0.90012 (verify live)5CVSS 6.5 (CISA)3CISA SSVC Exploitation: active · Automatable: slow · Impact: partial3Exploit Public PoC / detection · Metasploit module11
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
15 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-03-07), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.90012 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
CVSS 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) · Affected: Adobe, BlazeDS. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.CVSS — CISA-assigned via the ADP container (CVE.org), version 3.1; the CNA left no metrics, so CISA's own score is used ahead of NVD.
CISA-ADP ↗Reported
CISA SSVC (triage disposition)
Exploitation: active · Automatable: slow · Technical Impact: partialCISA's own stakeholder-specific triage inputs, published in the CVE record (CISA Coordinator role). NOTE: this is CISA's three decision points; the final Act/Attend/Track decision also requires a Mission & Well-being input not published here, so no overall decision is asserted.
CISA-ADP ↗Reported
Currency of the record
CISA added this to its KEV catalog 4403 days after the CVE record was published.KEV lag = CISA-KEV dateAdded − CVE.org datePublished; a floor on how long the known-exploited flaw sat in the public record before the federal catalog listed it. Severity/weakness here is CNA- or CISA-assigned (current at disclosure), independent of NVD's analysis backlog.
Public exploit available
Public exploit tooling is catalogued for this CVE (a public proof-of-concept / detection template). Catalog entries: Metasploit module. We link the catalog page(s) only — no payload or code is hosted or restated here.Link, never host — the catalog page is the source; basicsecurity.net does not redistribute payloads.
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I exploit the information disclosure flaw in BlazeDS to extract sensitive data from the target system.
Business
Confidential business information, customer data, or system credentials are compromised, creating compliance violations and breach notification obligations.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I use disclosed information to escalate privileges or pivot to deploy ransomware across the infrastructure.
Business
Systems become encrypted and unavailable, halting operations and forcing costly recovery or ransom decisions.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 15 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CVSS 6.5 — CISA-assigned (CVE.org ADP)
  • CISA SSVC triage disposition (CVE.org ADP)
  • Catalogued by adobe (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by adobeCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.